15RL Study: How AI Agents Expose Credentials
15RL Study: How AI Agents Expose Credentials
Abstract
Credential exposure through AI agent operations is a pervasive problem that manifests in ways distinct from traditional secret leakage. 15 Research Lab analyzed over 300 agent sessions across 18 platforms to document how credentials are exposed during normal agent operations — not through adversarial attacks, but through routine task execution. Our findings reveal that credential hygiene in AI agent systems is significantly worse than in conventional software pipelines.
Methodology
We deployed instrumented AI agents across common use cases: code generation, DevOps automation, data analysis, and API integration. Each environment was seeded with credentials in realistic locations (environment variables, configuration files, secret managers). We tracked every instance where credentials appeared in agent outputs, logs, tool call parameters, or generated artifacts.
Exposure Pathways
Pathway 1: Log Contamination
The most prevalent exposure vector. In 78% of observed sessions, credentials appeared in plain text within agent execution logs. When agents execute API calls, the full request — including authentication headers — is typically logged by the agent framework. Most logging configurations do not redact sensitive values from tool call parameters.
Pathway 2: Generated Code Embedding
Agents tasked with writing code that interacts with APIs hardcoded credentials in 43% of cases, even when instructed to use environment variables. The pattern is consistent: when an agent has access to a credential and is asked to write functional code, it optimizes for immediate functionality over security best practices.
Pathway 3: Context Window Persistence
Credentials read by an agent persist in the context window and can resurface in unexpected outputs. In our testing, 31% of sessions exhibited "credential echo" — where a secret read early in a session appeared in an unrelated output later. This is particularly dangerous in multi-turn conversations where credentials from one task contaminate subsequent tasks.
Pathway 4: Tool Call Parameter Leakage
When agents invoke external tools or APIs, credentials are passed as parameters that may be transmitted to third-party services. In multi-agent architectures, credentials shared between agents often traverse intermediate systems with weaker security controls.
Quantitative Results
| Exposure Pathway | Sessions Affected | Avg. Credentials Exposed | Time to Exposure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Log Contamination | 78% | 3.2 per session | < 60 seconds |
| Code Embedding | 43% | 1.7 per session | 2-5 minutes |
| Context Window Echo | 31% | 1.1 per session | Variable |
| Tool Call Leakage | 56% | 2.4 per session | < 30 seconds |
Across all sessions, an average of 4.8 unique credentials were exposed per agent session through at least one pathway.
Credential Types Most Frequently Exposed
Cloud provider credentials are especially concerning given the blast radius of their compromise.
Mitigation Effectiveness
We evaluated several mitigation approaches:
Secret Manager Integration reduced code embedding by 67% but did not address log contamination or context window persistence. Log Redaction Patterns caught 71% of credential appearances in logs but suffered from high false-negative rates with non-standard credential formats. Action-Level Credential Gating showed the strongest results. By intercepting agent actions before execution and validating that credentials are not present in unauthorized contexts, this approach reduced overall credential exposure by 91%. SafeClaw implements credential-aware action gating that can detect and block tool calls containing exposed secrets. Combined with its audit logging capabilities — which themselves redact sensitive values — it addresses both the prevention and forensics aspects of credential exposure. Implementation patterns are documented in the SafeClaw knowledge base.Recommendations
Conclusion
Credential exposure through AI agents is not an edge case — it is the default behavior in most current deployments. Until agent frameworks treat credential handling as a first-class concern, organizations must implement external controls to prevent routine operations from becoming security incidents.
All credentials used in this study were synthetic and rotated immediately after testing.